Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Osgoode Digital Commons
Legal Philosophy between State and
Transnationalism Seminar Series

Seminars

3-2-2012

Modernist Islamic Political Thought and the
Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions of 2011

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/
transnationalism_series
Recommended Citation
"Modernist Islamic Political Thought and the Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions of 2011" (2012). Legal Philosophy between State and
Transnationalism Seminar Series. 10.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/transnationalism_series/10

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Seminars at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Legal
Philosophy between State and Transnationalism Seminar Series by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital Commons.

Draft
Not for citation
The Turn to the Political in Islamic Modernism
and the Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions
Mohammad Fadel
University of Toronto Faculty of Law*

“And religion is ease; the caliphate is by consent;
law is by consultation; and legal disputes are for
judges.”
Aḥmad Shawqī, d. 1932 1

I. Introduction
When civil disturbances broke out in Tunisia in December 2010 few people predicted
that those events would usher in a season of revolution in the Arab world throughout the
Arab region. After the initial shock of the Tunisian revolution wore off and the January
25th Egyptian Revolution began, many outside observers began to raise concerns centered
on the role of political Islam in Tunisia and Egypt, and in particular, the role of groups
such as The Renaissance Party (al-Nahḍa) in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood (alIkhwān al-Muslimūn) in Egypt. In the popular press, meanwhile, two salient themes
emerged: first, the bravery and the persistence of the Tunisian and Egyptian people in
waging largely non-violent demonstrations against brutal police states, and second the
tendency to reduce, or even deny entirely, the role of Islam in these two popular
revolutions. This latter desire seems to have been a product of the media’s sympathy
*

Note to the readers: this work remains very much a working draft, and I expect to make substantial
revisions to the arguments presented herein. To that extent, I look forward to receiving your comments. I
hope you will forgive the unfinished nature of this draft, but I expect the piece will be improved
substantially as a consequence of sharing it with you at this relatively early stage of drafting.
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This line is taken from a poem published in March 1912 (1313 in the Islamic calendar) on the
occasion of the Prophet Muḥammad’s birthday. Selections from this poem were in turn set to music and
sung by the renowned Egyptian singer Umm Kulthūm under the title “Wulida al-Hudā” (Guidance was
born). Nearly one hundred years later, it remains an important part of the modern Egyptian nationalist
musical repertoire. The poet himself was the official court poet for the pre-World War I nominal ruler of
Egypt, the Khedive ‘Abbās. The British forced both Shawqī and the Khedive into exile at the outbreak of
World War I for their sympathies with the Ottoman Empire.

with the popular revolutions, and negation of any meaningfully Islamic contribution to
these movements seems to have operated as a prerequisite to allowing outside observers
to feel sympathy for the revolutions in good faith.
And while Tunisian and Egyptian demonstrators should probably be grateful that
their revolutions did not spark irrational fears of Islamophobia that could have been
exploited by the dictatorial regimes to keep themselves in power, the attempt to minimize
the role of Islam in these revolutions does little to help us understand the course of
Islamic political thought over the last 150 years in the Arab world, its relationship to the
democratic demands of the Arab peoples, and the prospects for modern Islamic political
thought to reconcile, in a meaningful fashion, with certain forms of democratic
secularism. Indeed, the central hypothesis of this paper is that neither the Tunisian nor
the Egyptian Revolutions could have succeeded without the ideological contributions of
Islamic modernism to modern political thought in the Arab world. Accordingly, these
revolutions can be called Islamic revolutions, but only in the very specific sense of being
“modernist” Islamic revolutions.
A crucial feature of modernist Islamic political thought, at least as manifested in
the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, is its insistence that religious teachings, insofar as
they are relevant to building political society, must be interpreted in a manner consistent
with the goals of freedom, national development and democratic decision-making. This
modernist configuration of the theo-political in turn renders political coalitions with nonIslamic political movements palatable. Indeed, in important respects, Islamic modernists
are more comfortable with secular political movements than they are with other Islamic
modes of the theo-political, whether Sunni Traditionalism or Revolutionary Sunnism. It
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was the successful cooperation between modernist Islamic movements and secular
opposition which ultimately guaranteed the initial success of these two revolutions, and
consolidation of the revolutions’ achievements will require them to continue to cooperate
in the future.
This observation naturally leads one to ask: to what extent can one posit the
existence of a shared community of values between Islamic modernism and liberal
secularism in countries like Tunisia and Egypt? Answering that question, however, is
beyond the scope of this paper. This paper is limited to tracing what I consider to be the
salient characteristics of Islamic modernist political thought through the writings of three
seminal modernist Muslim political thinkers from the Arab world: Rifā‘a Rāfi‘ alṬahtāwī (d. 1873), Khayr al-Dīn al-Tūnisī (d. 1890), and Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā (d.
1935). The most important such values are the reconciliation of positive law with
revealed law; the necessity of constitutional government; national independence; and, the
mutually reinforcing relationship of political and religious virtues (and vices). [I will
then contrast Islamic modernism’s approach to the political with other Islamic
configurations of the theo-political. I will conclude with an analysis of the religious
rhetoric of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions in an attempt to demonstrate their
adherence to the political principles of Islamic modernism.] 2 But the first question to
address is whether it even makes sense to speak of “modernist” Islamic political thought
as a distinct tradition of political thought, and if so, why.
II. What is “Modernist” about Modernist Islamic Political Thought?
Rawls, in his work Political Liberalism, famously identified the central problem of
modern democracy as that of pluralism, or more specifically, the stability of democracy
2

I have yet to flesh out these two sections.
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in the context of pluralism. Similarly, in helping us to determine whether we are justified
in treating the political thought of figures such as al-Ṭahṭāwī, Khayr al-Dīn and Riḍā as
“modernist,” we need to offer some set of questions or concerns that both unifies their
particular contributions to Islamic political thought, on the hand, and distinguishes it from
other strains of Islamic political thought, on the other.
I propose the following as the central question that gives rise to what I am calling
“modernist” Islamic political thought: how is it possible to establish an effective system
of Islamic justice in the context of a post-enlightenment world characterized by rapid
scientific, economic and political change? Like other traditions of Sunni Islamic political
thought, whether traditionalist or revolutionary, they share the fundamental commitment
to the truth of Islam as a theological doctrine and that it provides a completely adequate
and universal system of justice through Islamic law. Unlike the adherents of the other
two camps, however, they also accept the legitimacy of the political, economic and
scientific accomplishments of the post-enlightenment world, while maintaining a
commitment to Islamic metaphysics as a source of truth.
One thing that is obviously missing from the concerns of modernist Islamic
political thought is the problem of pluralism, in particular religious pluralism and its
relationship to equality. Although the Arab Middle East was religiously plural, and
included numerous varieties of expansionist and salvationist religions, whether Islamic or
Christian, it never experienced the history of religious wars that engulfed Europe in the
wake of the religious divisions caused by the Reformation. Accordingly, the experience
of an all-out, religiously-driven civil war, simply never became a formative part of
Middle Eastern political culture, much less its tradition of political reflection. In addition
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to the historical differences between Europe and the Middle East with respect to religious
conflict, the role normative Islamic doctrine played in shaping the direction of Middle
Eastern political thought with respect to the problem of pluralism should not be
overlooked. In particular, because Islamic law had its own internal doctrines of restraint
with respect to both non-Muslims and “heretical” Muslims, Sunni Muslims were
generally committed only to maintaining their dominance within the political community
rather than eliminating the existence of non-conforming religious communities as such,
while at the same time maintaining the hope that non-conforming communities, whether
dissident Muslims or non-Muslims, would eventually adopt orthodox Islam.
This hierarchical system of pluralism, while internally justified by the truth of
Sunni Islam relative to other religious doctrines, was justified to non-Muslims on the
promise that the political order of Sunni Islam and whose anchor was Islamic law was a
just order and that it guaranteed non-Muslims their essential rights. Legally, this
relationship was manifested through the doctrine of dhimma, pursuant to which nonMuslims agreed to bind themselves to the non-religious norms of Islamic law (iltizām
aḥkām al-islām). In exchange for this commitment, the Muslim community undertook to
afford such non-Muslims all the legal (but not political) rights and protections afforded to
Muslims on a basis of equality. This system was encapsulated in a statement attributed to
the Prophet Muhammad who was reported as saying that if non-Muslims accepted this
relationship, “They have our rights and our obligations, but leave them to their religious
affairs (lahum mā lanā wa ‘alayhim mā ‘alaynā wa yutrakūna wa mā yadīnūna).” NonMuslims subject to this pre-modern system were effectively the equivalent of permanent
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resident aliens: while they enjoyed substantial rights under the law, they lacked the right
to participate in its formulation.
In normative Islamic doctrine, this hierarchical system of toleration was not
grounded merely in prudence, but was also an Islamic moral obligation, as evidenced by
the use of the term dhimma to refer to the contract, and the use of the term dhimmī to
refer to the non-Muslim party to the contract: dhimma is the legal term that refers to the
capacity of a human being to undertake an obligation to God or a human being; dhimmī
thus means a person who is the beneficiary of this moral obligation and can assert claims
against the conscience of the Muslim community, unlike other non-Muslims, who are
strictly limited to their contractual rights against the Muslim community.
By the 19th century, however, important transformations in the relationship
between Islamic states and Europe had shaken the confidence of the Sunni political and
religious elite. In particular, the Ottomans no longer seemed able to defend Islamic
territories against encroaching European powers, and while initially its military
weaknesses were felt primarily outside the Middle Eastern heartland of Islam, in 1798
French forces under the leadership of Napoleon Bonaparte, successfully invaded and
occupied Egypt. In the wake of the objective weakness of the Ottoman Empire vis-à-vis
Europe, the political class ushered in a series of political, administrative, and
increasingly, legal, reforms, first in Egypt and then throughout the Ottoman Empire.
These reforms, generally known as the Tanẓīmāt, were intended to usher in a new era, alniẓām al-jadīd.
For the Muslim political class that undertook these reforms, and both al-Ṭahṭāwi
and Khayr al-Dīn were important members of this class, it was necessary to produce a
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theory of reform that reconciled the new order to the underlying ideology of Sunni
political theory, namely, that the state is bound to Islamic law. The answer they give,
essentially, is that the new order – an important part of which is legal reform – does not
contradict or supplant the Sharī‘a, but instead vindicates it by making it more effective.
Islamic modernists’ quest to make the Sharī‘a more effective, like Rawls discovered in
his attempt to revise his account of stability in Theory of Justice, in turn required them to
argue for profound changes in the way Muslims understand Islamic law, its relationship
to rational politics (political philosophy), the relationship of the ruler and the ruled, and
the rights of non-Muslims.
Here, it may be useful to contrast the approach of modernist Islamic political
thought to the structure of Rawls’ argument in Political Liberalism: where Rawls aims to
describe the rules of a polity that free and equal persons would endorse under the morally
appropriate conditions provided by the initial position, and arrives at the idea of a “wellordered society as a society effectively regulated by a public conception of justice,”
modernist Muslim political thought begins with the knowledge of what constitutes a
“well-ordered society,” specifically, a society governed in accordance with Islamic law,
but what they lack is the knowledge of how to make that society effectively governed in
accordance with Islamic law’s norms. Western political thought and practice,
independent of its metaphysical commitments, can then be taken as a model of emulation
because it is assimilated into Islamic normative ideals as a tool that can be adapted and
put to a different metaphysical end.
Whether this project is intellectually satisfying or fully coherent is another
question. It is sufficient for the purposes of this paper simply to point out that modernist
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Islamic political thought, although it takes for granted the adequacy of the Sharī‘a as a
system of public justice, argues that its substantive norms must be interpreted in a manner
necessary to make it fully effective under modern conditions, and in so doing, radical
differences are introduced between modernist Islamic political doctrines relative to other
Islamic conceptions of the theo-political. It is the overriding concern with rendering
Islamic justice politically effective that justifies treating modernist Islamic political
thought as a distinct tradition of political thought, not only with respect to Western
political thought, but also other modes of Islamic political thought.
III. Ṭahṭāwī and the Centrality of the Homeland
Rifā‘a Rāfi‘ al-Ṭahṭāwī hailed from a small town in Upper Egypt and moved to Cairo to
complete his education at the mosque college of al-Azhar. When Mehmet ‘Alī, the then
Ottoman governor of Egypt and founder of the modern Egyptian state, sent a group of
Egyptian students to France to study the “modern sciences,” Ṭahṭāwī was selected to
accompany the students as their religious advisor while they sojourned in France. AlṬahṭāwī was a keen observer and student of French life and upon his return to Cairo, he
published the memoires of his journey (Takhlīṣ al-Ibrīz fī Talkhīṣ Bārīz) which, among
other things, described his life in Paris, and the social, cultural, political and economic
life of 19th century France. This work included a chapter discussing the French legal
system, including, its constitution, evidencing his interest in the new political ideas
emerging in Europe, a topic he would return to in much greater detail later in his life
when he wrote a lengthy treatise, ostensibly on education, called al-Murshid al-Amīn li-lBanāt wa-l-Banīn (“The Reliable Guide for Girls and Boys”).
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In addition to his career as a public intellectual, he had a distinguished career in
the Egyptian government, serving in a variety of administrative positions in the
modernizing Egyptian bureaucracy, including, as director of the newly established
medical school; translator for the artillery school; director of the School of Foreign
Languages which translated thousands of works in various fields into Arabic; director of
the Military School; editor of the official newspaper; and an educational journal. He also
participated in numerous educational reform commissions and personally translated two
dozen French works.
Although his memoirs included only one relatively short chapter (about 5% of the
work) on the French legal system, what he called their “wondrous administration
(tadbīruhum al-‘ajīb)” clearly impressed him and he was determined to describe it
accurately so that it “could be an example to those who take heed (‘ibratan li-man
i‘tibar).” In his memoires Ṭahṭāwī was largely content with providing an objective
account of French institutions as he understood them with minimal commentary. The
commentary he does provide, however, is indicative of the political values of the French
post-Revolutionary constitutional monarchy that he found admirable. First, and perhaps
most significantly, was the fact that the king’s power was limited by and subject to the
laws of France. 3 Accordingly, French law (al-siyāsa al-faransāwiyya) serves as a
constraint on the king’s power (qānūn muqayyad) and in accordance with that principle
the king’s powers are only lawful when they are exercised within those constraints. The
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Takhlis, p. 169.
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basic law of France, which he identifies as the Charter of 1814, “contains matters which
no rational persons would deny are constitutive of justice.” 4
The second critical observation was the Charter’s status as rational law, meaning
that it did not derive its authority from any supernatural source. Despite this fact, or
perhaps precisely because the Charter disclaimed any religious authority, he chose to
describe its provisions in detail so that his audience, who might have been skeptical that a
rational polity of the sort Ṭahṭāwī described might actually exist, could appreciate “how
their reason caused them to understand that justice and fairness are among the causes of
increased civilization and relief for the subjects, how both the ruler and the ruled
submitted to it, producing prosperity for their country, the creation of knowledge, the
accumulation of wealth and security of hearts.” 5
Third, after his translation of the Charter’s provisions, he identifies its most
significant provisions, beginning with equality before the law. He tells his readers that
this represents for the French the foundational principle of the Charter, whose importance
to the French he identifies to his Muslim readers by using the Islamic concept of “fecund
speech (jawāmi‘ al-kalim),”a term loaded with theological heft: it is an express allusion
to the Prophet Muḥammad’s self-description of his own law-making activity as “fecund
speech” which was a divine favor of inestimable worth. 6
Ṭahṭāwī chose to translate freedom literally as ḥurriyya, but his gloss on the
meaning of this term is significant. Rather than understanding it as the absence of
4

wa fīhi umūr lā yunkir dhawū al-‘uqūl annahā min bāb al-‘adl. Id. p. 170.
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The Prophet Muḥammad is reported to have said “I have been given pregnant speech (la-qad ūtītu
min jawāmi‘ al-kalim)” which jurists later took to be a reference to the fact that the laws and principles he
communicated, despite their brevity, were applicable to vast range of cases.
6
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internal or external restraint, he chose to describe it as justice (‘adl) and fairness (inṣāf).
Freedom, from Ṭahṭāwī’s perspective, is a feature of a political order, and accordingly “a
[political] system of freedom means establishing equality with respect to legal judgments
and substantive laws so that the ruler does not act arbitrarily against any person; rather, it
[i.e., freedom] is that the laws are the judge and the criteria [for decision in all cases] (lianna ma‘nā al-ḥukm bi-l-ḥurriyya huwa iqāmat al-tasāwī fī al-aḥkām wa-l-qawānīn biḥaythu lā yajūr al-ḥākim ‘alā insān bal al-qawānīn hiya al-muḥakkama wa-lmu‘tabara).” 7 A country is free only to the extent that its people enjoy effective equality
under its laws.
Thus far Ṭahṭāwī has focused largely on certain procedural aspects of law in postRevolutionary France, namely, its rejection of absolutist monarchy and its commitment to
equality under the law. Ṭahṭāwī analysis of the substantive rights guaranteed by the
Charter begins with the principle of equal opportunity set forth in the Charter’s third
provision. He identifies this provision as the key to understanding French prosperity
because it motivates citizens to pursue their individual talents, thus extending the breadth
and depth of French prosperity and civilization. Ṭahṭāwī also identifies the Charter’s
eighth provision – freedom of expression, particularly as manifested in freedom of the
press – as crucial in establishing accountability and in the dissemination of useful
information. 8
And while French constitutional law clearly impressed Ṭahṭāwī, he was less
impressed with its positive law: it lacked any basis in revelation and thus was derived
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Ibid. pp. 183-184.
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almost entirely from rulers and was unstable (laysat qārrat al-furū‘). Nevertheless, he
concludes his discussion of the French state’s laws with two lines of poetry that suggest a
certain level of anxiety: “Whoever claims a need that causes him to leave the path of
revelation, take him not for a companion, for he is a harm with no benefit!” 9
Whatever Ṭahṭāwī’s state of mind was when he wrote his memoires, he clearly
continued to think about the relationship of revealed law to rational law throughout the
rest of his career. Indeed, the concern he shows in his Parisian memoires with
reconciling what he recognizes as the rational politics of the French with the revealed
politics of Islam is a prominent theme of his later work, The Reliable Guide. Although
Ṭahṭāwī’s work is ostensibly a work on education, tarbiya, he is compelled to discuss the
his political theory insofar as proper education, in his view, entails both rational and
religious sciences, and accordingly, he must take a position between the claims of each.
Thus, in the first part of his discussion of education, he warns his readers to take care not
to follow those who would derive their morality from their rational intuitions (alladhīna
ḥakkamū ‘uqūlahum bi-mā iktasabūhu min al-khawāṭir allatī rakanū ilayhā taḥsīnan wa
taqbīḥan). 10 He instead counsels that individuals should be taught law using the
techniques of revelation, not abstract reason (fa-yanbaghī ta‘līm al-nufūs al-siyāsa biṭuruq al-shar‘ lā bi-ṭuruq al-‘uqūl al-mujarrada). 11 Even as he expresses profound
suspicion of those who would ground moral knowledge in what he terms rational
intuitions, he is keen on disclaiming any general hostility to reason, and in the next
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Ibid. p. 188.
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Ibid. p. 61.
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Ibid. p. 62.
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sentence writes “it being known that the noble revelation does not prohibit seeking
benefits or warding off harm and does not oppose the wondrous innovations which those
whom God most high has granted reason and inspired in them useful crafts are inventing
(wa ma‘lūm anna al-shar‘ al-sharīf lā yuḥadhdhir jalb al-manāfi‘ wa dar’ al-mafāsid wa
lā yunāfī al-mutajaddidāt al-mustaḥsana allatī yakhtari‘uhā man manaḥahum allāhu
ta‘ālā al-‘aql wa alhamahum al-ṣanā‘a).” 12 Throughout the rest of his book Ṭahṭāwī
will struggle in attempting to distinguish the morally dubious metaphysical claims of
reason to authority, from its legitimate claims to ordering life in the context of a Muslim
polity.
While Ṭahṭāwī was hardly the first Muslim thinker to conceptualize the
problematic relationship between scripturally-grounded ethics/law and rationally-derived
norms, his analysis is unique insofar as it is mediated through the concept of the
homeland (al-waṭan), and the obligations that persons owe to their homeland. In other
words, Ṭahṭāwī hopes to resolve the tension between these two competing sources of
authority in the specific context of how to formulate a polity that honors the homeland in
the appropriate fashion. The obligation to honor the homeland is akin to the moral
obligation of the child to honor his parent, as evidenced by the title “On the Sons of the
Homeland and Their Obligations.” 13 This is a natural obligation universally shared
among mankind and finds its origins in longing (ḥanīn) and love (tashawwuq) to the
place where one is born and raised. 14
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Ibid. p. 93.
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Ibid. p. 90.
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The most important duty they owe the homeland is its improvement (iṣlāḥ), a task
which God has naturally prepared them to undertake by providing them with a “single
king, submission to a single basic law [sharī‘a wāḥida] and a single positive law [siyāsa
wāḥida].” Accordingly, “it is as though the homeland is in the position of their mother
and father, and the place of their upbringing, so that it should also be the place of their
mutual happiness (fa-ka’anna al-waṭan huwa manzil ābā’ihim wa ummahātihim wa
maḥall murabbāhum fa-l-yakun maḥallan li-sa‘ādatihim al-mushataraka baynahum).”
Thus, all children of the homeland should have the common intention of directing the
homeland to virtue and honor. They should also honor the homeland’s rights and those of
their brethren. The relationship between the citizens and the homeland, moreover, is
reciprocal: just as the citizens have duties toward one another and the homeland, so too
the homeland owes its citizens obligations, namely, “protecting the citizen from
everything that harms him.” 15 Love of homeland and love of achieving the general good
for one’s compatriots is a morally desirable trait that is within the grasp of all citizens,
and is a cause for their mutual love: “How fortunate is the person who inclines by his
nature to distance evil from his homeland, even if that means he harms himself!” 16
Ṭahṭāwī used the concept of tamaddun to describe the process by which the
homeland is improved. Tamaddun is often translated as “civilization,” and provided that
one understands the term as encompassing both material civilization (which Ṭahṭāwī
describes using the more narrow term ‘umrān) and moral norms, it is an acceptable
translation. For purposes of clarity, I will use the Arabic term. Accordingly, he defines
tamaddun as “The realization of what is required for the people of a material civilization
15

Ibid. p. 94.
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Ibid. pp. 94-95.
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(ahl al-‘umrān) in respect of the means (adawāt) necessary to improve their conditions,
materially and morally, which consists in the excellence of their character, customs,
moral education, and encouraging them to love praiseworthy qualities and to acquire
perfection of their civic characteristics (istijmā‘ al-kamāliyyāt al-madaniyya).” 17
The principles of genuine civilization are known through revelation as disclosed
by the prophets’ laws (risālat al-rusul bi-l-sharā’i‘); the principles and rules of the
Islamic revelation in particular are responsible for universal civilization (alladhī jā’a bihi
al-islām min al-uṣūl wa-l-aḥkām huwa alladhī maddana bilād al-dunyā ‘alā al-iṭlāq wa
inba‘athat anwār hadyihi fī sā’ir al-āfāq). He justifies this claim on the grounds that any
person who assiduously studies the foundational principles of Islamic jurisprudence (uṣūl
al-fiqh) and its substantive rules (fiqh) knows that “all the rational rules that civilized
non-Muslim peoples (i.e., Europeans) have derived in developing their civilization and
which they made the foundation of their civilization’s laws and rules scarcely differ in
substance from the substantive legal rules which have been derived from the foundational
principles [of Islamic jurisprudence] that constitute the field of transactions (jamī‘ alistinbāṭāt al-‘aqliyya allatī waṣalat ‘uqūl bāqī al-umam al-mutamaddina ilayhā wa
ja‘alūhā asāsan li-waḍ‘ qawānīn tamaddunihā wa aḥkāmihim qalla an takhruj ‘an tilka
al-uṣūl allatī buniyat ‘alayhā al-furū‘ al-fiqhiyya allatī ‘alayhā madār al-mu‘āmalāt).” 18
Al-Ṭahṭāwī explains that what Muslims call “the foundations of jurisprudence
(uṣūl al-fiqh) is what they [i.e., Europeans] call natural rights (al-ḥuqūq al-ṭabī‘iyya) or
natural law (al-nawāmīs al-fiṭriyya).” These are rules which, according to Ṭahṭāwī, they
derive based on what their reason deems to be good or bad (qawā‘id ‘aqliyya taḥsīnan aw
17

Ibid. 124.
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taqbīḥan). As for what Muslims call substantive law (furū‘ al-fiqh), the Europeans call it
civil law and civil rights (al-ḥuqūq wa-l-aḥkām al-madaniyya). He further explains that
what Muslims call “impartiality and liberality (‘adl wa iḥsān),” the Europeans call
“freedom and equality.” What Europeans call patriotism Muslims call love of religion,
because for Muslims love of the homeland is a part of faith. Muslims are therefore
motivated to love the homeland for two reasons: the same natural reasons that make
others patriotic, and on account of the religious reasons that Islam also imposes on
them. 19
Finally, among the means for the spread of tamaddun is zealous adherence to
revelation’s teachings (al-tamassuk bi-l-shar‘) and diligent pursuit of learning and the
sciences (mumārasat al-‘ulūm wa-l-ma‘ārif), and giving priority to agriculture,
commerce, industry and geography (istikshāf al-bilād). 20
Freedom results in a people’s happiness, and when their freedom is grounded in
just laws, it plays a crucial role in producing love of the homeland, and thus helps spread
tamaddun, at least by implication. 21 Freedom as a general matter is the permission
(rukhṣa) to perform any act that is, all things being equal, permissible (mubāḥ). A person
is free (ḥurr) when he is able to exercise these rights without any interference other than a
rule of law, whether derived from revealed law or positive law, in accordance with the
just principles of his country (al-māni‘ al-maḥdūd bi-l-shar‘ aw al-siyāsa mimmā
tastad‘īhi uṣūl mamlakatihi al-‘ādila). It also means that one cannot be punished except
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in accordance with legitimate criminal law, again whether derived from revelation or
positive law in accordance with his country’s basic law (wa min ḥuqūq al-ḥurriyya alahliyya an lā yujbar al-insān ‘alā an yunfā min baladihi aw yu‘āqab fīhā illā bi-ḥukm
shar‘ī aw siyāsī muṭābiq li-uṣūl mamlakatihi). 22
Ṭahṭāwī recognizes five different kinds of freedom. The most fundamental is
natural freedom (al-ḥurriyya al-ṭabī‘iyya) which is simply the freedom to satisfy human
necessities such as eating and drinking. The second is freedom of conduct (al-ḥurriyya
al-sulūkiyya), whose norms are derived through reason in accordance with each
individual’s conscience and that in which his soul finds comfort with respect to his own
conduct and noble manners in his treatment of others (al-wasf al-lāzim li-kull fard min
afrād al-jam‘iyya al-mustantaj min ḥukm al-‘aql bi-mā taqtaḍīhi dhimmat al-insān
taṭma’innu ilayhi nafsuhu fī sulūkihi fī nafsihi wa ḥusn al-akhlāq fī mu‘āmalat ghayrihi).
Religious freedom is the freedom to adopt theological and legal doctrines that are not
heretical (al-ḥurriyya al-dīniyya hiya ḥurriyat al-‘aqīda wa-l-ra’y wa-l-madhhab bi-sharṭ
an lā takhruj ‘an aṣl al-dīn), but interestingly, the power of rulers to make laws according
to Ṭahāwī is itself cast as derivative of religious freedom, apparently on the grounds that
political differences (al-madhāhib al-siyāsiyya) are like the legal differences of the
historical legal schools in Islam. Accordingly, “kings and their ministers are free to adopt
various rational measures using different methods all of which derive from one origin,
namely that of good judgment and justice (mulūk al-mamālik wa wuzarā’ahum
murakhkhaṣūn fī ṭuruq al-ijrā’āt al-siyāsiyya bi-awjuh mukhtalifa tarji‘ ilā marji‘ wāḥid
wa huwa ḥusn al-siyāsa wa-l-‘adl).”
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Civic freedom (al-ḥurriyya al-madaniyya) bears similarities to the idea of the
rights that flow from a social contract and it consists in that freedom which the citizens of
a polis (madīna) enjoy together, “it being as though the social institution which is
composed of the people of the country have mutually guaranteed and agreed to respect
the rights of one another (taḍāmant wa tawāṭa’at ‘alā adā’ ḥuqūq ba‘ḍihim li-ba‘ḍ) and
that each one of them guarantees to the other that he will assist them in their performance
of everything that does not violate the country’s basic law and not to oppose him, and
that they will reject, together, all those who oppose him in exercising his freedom on
condition that he does not go outside the bounds of the law (fa-ka‘anna al-hay’a alijtimā‘iyya al-mu’allafa min ahālī al-mamlaka taḍāmanat wa tawāṭa’at ‘alā adā’ ḥuqūq
ba‘ḍihim li-ba‘ḍ wa anna kulla fard min afrādihim ḍammana li-l-bāqīn an yusā‘idūhum
‘alā fi‘lihim kulla shay’ lā yukhālif sharī‘at al-bilād wa an lā yu‘āriḍūhu wa an yunkirū
jamī‘an ‘alā man yu‘āriḍuhu fī ijrā’ ḥurriyyatihi bi-sharṭ an lā yata‘addā ḥudūd alaḥkām).” 23 The last category of freedom is political freedom (al-ḥurriyya al-siyāsiyya)
and that is the state’s guarantee to the people that it will not interfere in their legal
rights. 24
Equality (al-taswiya) among the citizens (ahālī al-jam‘iyya) is a natural attribute
of humanity (ṣifa ṭabī‘iyya fī al-insān) which requires that each person have all the civic
rights (al-ḥuqūq al-baladiyya) of his fellow compatriots. Equality derives from the fact
that all people share the same essence and attributes (jamī‘ al-nās mushtarikūn fī
dhawātihim wa ṣifātihim), e.g., they all have the same organs and limbs, and they all have
an equal need for the means of life. Accordingly, they are all equal with respect to the
23

Ibid. p. 128.

24

Ibid.

18

requirements of this temporal life (kānū jamī‘an fī māddat al-ḥayāt al-dunyā ‘alā ḥadd
sawā’) and they all are the same with respect to using the things necessary to protect life
with no basis to giving preference to one over the other with respect to life. 25 Equality,
however, is in reality only relative, and thus humans are unequal with respect to natural
abilities, talents, and morals, but despite these actual differences, God has made them
equal with respect to the law. Accordingly, “equality means just equality under the law
(fa-laysa li-l-taswiya ma‘nā ākhar li-ishtirākihim fī al-aḥkām bi-an yakūnū fīhā ‘alā ḥadd
sawā’).” Moreover, because equality is a natural condition, it is inconceivable that
positive laws could abrogate it (lā yumkin an tarfa‘a hādhihi al-taswiya min baynihim alaḥkām al-waḍ‘iyya). 26
Concomitant with freedom’s requirement for equality in rights is equality in
obligations, i.e., respecting the rights of others, and freedom from an operational
perspective means simply the faithful discharge by citizens of the duties they owe one
another, since in each case where a party claims a right there is another person who has
an obligation to honor it. Consequently, rights and obligations are always concurrent and
symmetrical (al-ṭālib dhū al-ḥaqq wa al-maṭlūb huwa dhū al-wājib fa-l-wājibāt dā’iman
mulāzima li-l-ḥuqūq lā tanfakku ‘anhā).” A person who habitually performs his
obligations and demands his rights (but no more) is described as ‘adl, a person of
integrity (fa-man addā wājibātihi wa istawfā ḥuqūqahu min ghayrihi wa kān da’bahu
dhālika). This quality causes him to be upright in his speech and his actions, and to be
fair to himself and others (yantaṣif li-nafsihi wa li-ghayrihi). This quality of integrity
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according to Ṭahāwī is the basis of all other moral virtues, including political virtues such
as patriotism (ḥubb al-waṭan) and even religious piety, with the highest degree of
integrity found in the Prophet’s statement “None of you believe until he wishes for his
brother what he wishes for himself.” 27
Throughout his discourse on the homeland, and indeed even in earlier sections of
his treatise, Ṭahṭāwī has had occasion to refer to various different normative registers,
including, shar‘, sharī‘a, qānūn, ḥukm ṭabī‘ī, siyāsa and nāmūs. And while it is not clear
whether he used these terms rigorously, it appears that he was trying to weave an account
of the polity that preserved the centrality of revealed law – which he usually calls shar‘ or
al-sharī‘a, with the term sharī‘a, when used as an indefinite noun, functioning in the
generic, non-sectarian sense of “basic law” – as a foundational element to the state while
making the substantive claims of revealed law to be virtually indistinguishable from the
rules deriving from the rational sources of legal obligation, qānūn and siyāsa. For
example, he argues that the civic obligations that are the subject of civil freedom, whether
arising out of revelation or positive law (al-takālīf al-shar‘iyya wa-l-siyāsiyya), are each
consistent with rationality “because revealed law [i.e., Islamic law] and positive law are
based on practical wisdom rationally accessible to us (li-anna al-sharī‘a wa-l-siyāsa
mabniyyatān ‘alā al-ḥikma al-ma‘qūla lanā).” As a matter of proper theology, however,
we cannot rely on what reason finds appealing or what it rejects as a stable foundation for
our judgment until revelation confirms it as good or bad (wa innamā laysa lanā an
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na‘tamida ‘alā mā yuḥassinuhu al-‘aql aw yuqabbiḥuhu illā idhā warada al-shar‘ bitaḥsīnihi aw taqbīḥihi). 28
His affirmation of the orthodox Ash‘arī theological position that reason cannot, on
its own, establish the goodness or evilness of an act, does not cause him to deny what he
calls “natural judgment which is derived from reason (al-ḥukm al-ṭabī‘ī al-mustanid ilā
al-‘aql).” 29 This kind of judgment originates prior to the time that God sent messengers
with revealed law and was placed by God in human nature (al-quwā al-bashariyya) and
is shared universally among human beings without regard to the particular laws
(qawānīn) of each country with the purpose of directing them to what acts were
permissible. 30 Moreover, every species, and every members of a species, human and
non-human, is itself subject to natural laws (nawāmīs ṭabī‘iyya) which under no normal
circumstances can be violated because they are constitutive of being a member of that
species. 31
Even though orthodox Islamic thought denies any power of causation to nature, a
doctrine Ṭahṭāwī affirms, human beings are bound, pursuant to the rules of “natural
laws,” to respect the observed order of causation in the natural world. 32 Revealed rules
(al-aḥkām al-shar‘iyya) are largely, if not overwhelmingly, consistent with the rules of
“natural laws” because those rules are “dispositional, God most high having created them
in the human being and having made them co-extensive with him in existence, it being as
28
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though they are a mold for him in which he was formed and stamped in accordance with
its model, and it being as though they were written on the tablet of his heart as a kind of
divine inspiration without mediation, after which the laws of the prophets came (fa hiya
fiṭriyya khalaqahā allāhu subḥānahu wa ta‘ālā ma‘a al-insān wa ja‘alahā mulāzima lahu
fī al-wujūd fa-ka’annahā qālib lahu nusijat ‘alā minwālihi wa ṭubi‘at ‘alā mithālihi fī alwujūd wa ka-annamā hiya suṭirat fī lawḥ fu’ādihi bi-ilhām ilāhī bi-dūn wāsiṭa thumma
jā’at ba’dahā sharā’i‘ al-anbiyā’).” 33 It was in reliance on these natural laws that the
philosophers and the ancients could establish law during periods in which revelation was
absent (azmān al-fatra). 34
Despite the substantial congruence in substance between the rules advanced by
revelation and the rules produced by reason, Ṭahṭāwī does not dissolve one into the other.
Accordingly, there are times they can conflict, and when they do it is the distinguishing
feature of Muslim states to give effect to revelation while states that depend exclusively
on rational law making will of course adopt the rule that reason suggests. The one
example that Ṭahṭāwī provides for such a conflict concerns women acting as heads of
state: this can occur only in states whose laws recognize only positive law (al-bilād allatī
qawānīnuhā maḥḍ siyāsa waḍ‘iyya). 35 Because the rules of such countries are based on
personal freedom without regard to revelation, it necessarily permits the unrestrained
mixing of the sexes (ikhtilāṭ al-rijāl bi-l-nisā’) whereas in Muslim states, whose laws are
founded on the lawful and unlawful as set forth in revelation, pure reason is not a basis
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for establishing a rule (tamaddun al-mamālik al-islāmiyya mu’assas ‘alā al-taḥlīl wa altaḥrīm al-shar‘iyyatayn bi-dūn madkhal li-l-‘aql taḥsīnan wa taqbīḥan fī dhālika). 36
On the other hand, Ṭahṭāwī does not make non-religious reasoning (siyāsa)
irrelevant to law making in a Muslim state either. The ruler has the power, for example,
when he notices that something is beneficial for the people, to prohibit what revelation
otherwise permits to prevent a harm that could result to the people from practicing that
otherwise permitted act (wa innamā yajūz li-l-ḥakim idhā ra’ā maṣlaḥa ẓāhira li-lra‘iyya shar‘iyya mar‘iyya ka-makhāfat ḍarar yalḥaq al-ra‘iyya fī dīnihā aw dunyāhā an
yanhā ‘an ba‘ḍ al-mubāḥāt allatī yatarattab ‘alayhā al-ḍarar). What is forbidden is for
the government to issue rules based on revelation according to its own inclinations, and
on these matters, it is bound by the historical rules of Islamic law as found in the opinions
of the scholars and the great legal scholars (lā yasūgh li-mutawallī al-aḥkām an yaḥkum fī
al-taḥrīm wa-l-taḥlīl bimā yulā’im mizājahu mimmā yukhālif al-awdā‘ al-shar‘iyya almanqūla ‘an al-a’imma al-mujtahidīn wa lā ‘ibrata . . . bi-l-istiḥsān al-ṭabī‘ī wa-l-akhdh
bi-l-ra’y min ghayr dalīl shar‘ī bal ya‘tamid mutawallī al-aḥkām ‘alā fatāwā al-‘ulamā’
wa aqwāl al-mujtahdīn). Ṭahṭāwī’s intent here is subtle: while he denies public officials
the right to interpret religious law, he affirms their right to create rational law, but only on
condition that they do not claim that their rational laws are themselves part of revealed
law.
Accordingly, the ruler has the power, indeed the duty, to adopt political rules to
protect and enhance the welfare of the people, and when he adopts such a rule, provided
that it is based on the people’s welfare, it is binding (ṣāra wājiban). 37 What is prohibited,

36
37

Ibid. p. 123.
Ibid. pp. 123-124.

23

then, is for the ruler to make positive law based arbitrarily, or to permit acts that
revelation has prohibited. Whatever revelation has prohibited is simply outside the scope
of civilization (mā yamna‘uhu al-shar‘ ṣarāḥatan aw ḍimnan fa-ghayru mubāḥ wa lā
yu‘addu tamaddunan). On the other hand, the ruler is empowered to interfere with what
revelation has ruled is permissible (mubāḥāt) in accordance with what reason considers to
be good and bad by using his power as ruler to transfer them from one legal category,
e.g., permitted, to another category, e.g., forbidden or obligatory, with a resulting
improvement in the people’s condition. Whereas a ruler’s attempt to permit something
that revelation has forbidden cannot be deemed part of the civilizing project that is the
state’s duty, the ruler’s use of reason to improve the condition of the people by
supplementing revealed law with wise human law falls squarely within the domain of
civilization, and indeed, “is precisely the civilization of which we speak.” 38
For Ṭahṭāwī rational law is not part of the sharī‘a in the first instance, but it
becomes a legitimate part of that law – provided that it used to further the ends of
civilization, i.e., it furthers the public good – as a second order matter. Accordingly, one
can say that while revealed law is foundational for true civilization in Ṭahāwī’s view, it is
not sufficient to perfect civilization. For that, rational law-making is required, and for
this reason, siyāsa can be said to be revelation’s complement in Ṭahṭāwī’s thought rather
than its rival that seeks to eliminate it.
IV. Khayr al-Dīn and the Tanẓīmāt
Khayr al-Dīn al-Tūnisī was an Ottoman statesman who first served as prime minister in
Tunisia where he implemented a series of wide-ranging political and administrative
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reforms. A fierce advocate of the internal Ottoman-reform movement known as the
tanẓīmāt, he came to the attention of the Ottoman Sulṭān who appointed him as the grand
vizier of the Ottoman Empire. Policy disagreements with the Sulṭān, however, led him to
resign a mere eight months after his appointment. He lived out the rest of his days in
retirement in Istanbul.
His work, Aqwam al-Masālik fī Ma‘rifat Aḥwāl al-Mamālik, a treatise on
government and comparison of European politics with that in the Islamic world, both in
his day and across history, became famous among 19th century reformers, with Ṭahṭāwī
referring to it in his work al-Murshid al-Amīn, and calling him “the greatest of the princes
and the pride of the great (amīr al-umarā’ wa fakhr al-kubarā’).” 39 Aqwam al-Masālik,
unlike Ṭahṭāwī’s al-Murshid al-Amīn, does not attempt to lay out an ideal theory of the
state in the fashion of his contemporary; rather, it is a book of practical statecraft whose
goal is to give a defense of the tanẓīmāt. Generically, it bears closest resemblance to the
genre of writing in the pre-modern Muslim world known as mirrors-for-princes. Such
works were intended to encourage rulers to deal justly with their subjects, both for
reasons of practical power politics and for the religious duty to rule justly. Typically,
such works would be written by a member of the religious class to the ruler of his day.
Instead of argument, these works consisted largely of hortatory statements praising just
rulers and condemning tyrants, anecdotes of exemplary rulers, both good and bad, and
various aphorisms that were considered illustrative of the demands of practical justice.
Khayr al-Dīn’s work is certainly not free of such elements, but what makes his
work unique is that it is written by a politician primarily for religious scholars, in a
radical reversal of the usual relationship between politicians and religious scholars.
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Khary al-Dīn’s decision to address directly the religious scholars was not motivated by a
desire to author a theological treatise or to correct some long-standing theological error;
rather, he believed that his reform program could only work if he was able to enlist the
support of substantial numbers of the religious class. His need for their support was not
limited to the necessity of neutralizing one potentially powerful source of opposition to
the reforms; rather, he needed their affirmative support because he believed that a
reformed Islamic law would play a critical role in making his proposed reforms effective,
but for his vision to succeed, the religious scholars would need to revise dramatically
their role in the governance of Islamic societies.
For Khayr al-Dīn, the prosperity and strength of a state were a function entirely of
the quality of its governance. Under his theory, good governance produced security,
which in turn encouraged the citizens of the state to invest, which in turn led to
innovations and progress, as can be seen to have occurred in Europe. 40 Good governance
is in turn dependent upon just laws and their effective administration. Accordingly,
European superiority was not on account of a more favorable climate, as evidenced by
the fact that other regions of the world were equally blessed with natural resources. Nor
can European superiority be attributed to Christianity as was evidenced by the
backwardness of the Papal states and the fact that Christianity, at least in his opinion, is
indifferent to secular affairs, being a religion devoted entirely to worship and asceticism.
This means that the only explanation for European progress is their system of positive
laws that fulfill the requirements of political justice to the point that justice has become
natural in their lands (al-amn wa al-‘adl ṣārā ṭabī‘tan fī buldānihim).
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It should come as no surprise to Muslims, Khayr al-Dīn argues, that justice is the
centerpiece of European progress because the Sharī‘a itself confirms the centrality of
justice to the health of states and attributes their collapse to its absence. 41 This much of
his argument is lock, stock and barrel from the mirror-for-princes genre, and indeed he
even manages to cite an oft-repeated aphorism found from this genre of works which
states that “sovereignty is the foundation [of a state] and justice is the guardian.
Whatever lacks a foundation collapses, and whatever lacks a guardian is lost (al-mulk
asās wa al-‘adl ḥāris fa-mā la yakūn lahu asās fa-mahdūm wa mā lam yakun lahu ḥāris
fa-ḍā’i‘).” 42
What is unique in his argument is that autocracy (istibdād) itself is identified as
contrary to justice and must be replaced or brought under control with some combination
of revealed law, rational law, or both. Wherever autocracy is entrenched, one finds
injustice and backwardness; wherever it is checked, one finds freedom and progress,
something that is confirmed both by Islamic history and European history. When Islamic
civilization was advanced and prosperous, Muslim rulers respected the Sharī‘a and did
not rule autocratically. After the collapse of the caliphate into three warring factions –
the ‘Abbāsids, the Fāṭimids and the Umayyads, the Ottomans rescued the Muslim
community by reinstituting respect for the Sharī‘a and promulgating just and rational
laws (qānūn), in particular Sulaymān the Lawgiver in the 16th century CE. The relative
decline of Islamic civilization in the modern period is precisely attributable to the decline
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in the efficacy of the Sharī‘a and the qānūn as rulers began to ignore their requirements
with impunity.
Respect for the Sharī‘a is an important part of good governance because it entails
numerous principles crucial for good governance, including: freeing individuals from the
control of their arbitrary passion (hawā); respecting the rights of others, whether Muslim
or non-Muslim; taking account of the public interest in light of changing circumstances;
warding off harm rather than seeking new benefits; and, choosing the lesser of two evils.
But, its most important political value in Khayr al-Dīn’s estimation is its mandate against
autocracy through the requirement of consultation (shūrā) in all public matters. The
centrality of consultation in public affairs to the Sharī‘a’s conception of good governance
is evidenced in Khayr al-Dīn’s opinion by the fact that God ordered the Prophet
Muḥammad, despite his infallibility as a prophet, to consult his companions in all matters
of public concern. 43
The Sharī‘a also provides a mechanism for ensuring the maintenance of good
governance: commanding the good and forbidding the evil. The Sharī‘a thus provides a
coherent answer to the dilemma posed by the state: the state is needed as a restraint
(wāzi‘) against humans’ natural tendency to oppress one another, but without an effective
mechanism that can restrain the state, the state, instead of protecting rights, can itself
despoil the rights of the people. The function of commanding the good and forbidding
the evil in the Sharī‘a is precisely to monitor the state and assure that it complies with
law. “Accordingly, there must be a countervailing force (wāzi‘) to the government, to
stop it, whether in the form of divine law or rational politics. But, neither one of these
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can defend itself if it is violated, and for that reason, it is an obligation on the religious
scholars of the community and its leading men to demand remediation when the law is
violated (fa-lā budda li-l-wāzi‘ al-madhkūr min wāzi‘ yaqif ‘indahu immā shar‘ samāwī
aw siyāsa ma‘qūla wa kull minhumā lā yudāfi‘ ‘an ḥuqūqihi in untuhikat fa-li-dhālika
wajaba ‘alā ‘ulamā’ al-umma wa a‘yān rijālihā taghyīr al-munkarāt).” 44
But there is another reason that the Sharī‘a categorically rejects autocracy in
Khayr al-Dīn’s view that has nothing to do with the risk that the ruler will be tempted to
use his powers to oppress the populace: the likelihood that an autocrat, even a wellintentioned one, will be incompetent. Khayr al-Dīn makes the point that it is trivial law
that a ruler’s actions under the Sharī‘a are valid only to the extent that their decisions are
consistent with the public good. Determination of the public good, however, is a
complex matter, and it is unlikely to be achieved if the ruler attempts to formulate rules
based on his own opinion. Involvement of the leading men of the state in the
institutional decision-making of the state, far from constituting an interference in the
ruler’s jurisdiction, is a mechanism to insure that his decisions are in fact consistent with
the public good and are therefore lawful (wa ma‘lūm anna taṣarruf al-imām fī aḥwāl alra‘iyya lā yakhruj ‘an dā’irat al-maṣlaḥa wa anna al-qiyām bi-maṣāliḥ al-umma wa
tadbīr siyāsatihā mimmā lā yatayassar li-kull aḥad fa-ta‘ṭīl al-irāda ḥīna’idhin innamā
yaqa‘ fī shay’ khārij ‘an dā’irat al-taṣarruf al-musawwagh lahu). 45
Khayr al-Dīn’s great innovation then is to argue that Islamic law, through the two
principles of consultation and commanding the good and forbidding the evil, provides its
own principled response to the problem of autocracy and despotism, and thus provides
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the basic foundations for good governance. For this structure of governance to work,
however, religious scholars must take their role in governance seriously, for the
application of the Sharī‘a in particular circumstances is not something that can be
achieved merely through proficiency in textual interpretation. This is because of the
nature of Sharī‘a norms: typically, they are not specific rules, but rather provide general
governing principles, and accordingly Muslims must resort to the tools of practical
reasoning and good judgment to determine how best these general principles can be
applied in specific circumstances. What is needed then is an effective partnership
between knowledgeable men of state and religious scholars “so that they can cooperate,
the entirety of them, as though they were one person, toward achieving the community’s
welfare by discovering how to achieve the public good and ward off public harms . . . for
it is men of state who grasp [questions of] what is beneficial and what is harmful while
the religious scholars can then determine the form of the solution so that it is in
accordance with the Sharī‘a’s principles (yata‘āwanūna majmū‘uhum hā’ulā’i ‘alā naf‘
al-umma bi-jalb maṣāliḥihā wa dar’ mafāsidihā bi-ḥaythu yakūn al-jamī‘ ka-l-shakhṣ alwāḥid . . . fa-rijāl al-siyāsa yudrikūna al-maṣāliḥ wa manāshi’ al-ḍarar wa al-‘ulamā’
yuṭabbiqūna al-‘amal bi-muqtaḍāhā ‘alā uṣūl al-sharī‘a).” 46
Religious scholars who choose to isolate themselves from the affairs of state and
are ignorant of domestic and foreign affairs are incapable applying the Sharī‘a’s norms
effectively in the particular social circumstances of his society. By remaining aloof from
public life in the mistaken assumption that it is immoral to participate in politics,
religious scholars in fact aid the cause of despotism: by failing to discharge their duty to
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provide appropriate norms of the Sharī‘a to restrict the power of rulers, they effectively
give them free reign to do as they wish. 47 Indeed, he instead argues that the cooperation
of the learned religious scholars with the men of the state, with the aim of helping them
achieve the public good, is among the most important obligations of the law because that
is the only effective means for religious scholars to learn sufficiently about the world so
that they can effectively apply the Sharī‘a (min ahamm al-wājibāt shar‘an li-‘umūm almaṣlaḥa wa shiddat madkhaliyyat al-khulṭa al-madhkūra fī iṭlā‘ al-‘ulamā’ ‘alā alḥawādith allatī tatawaqqaf idārat al-sharī‘a ‘alā ma‘rifatihā). 48
Khayr al-Dīn is effectively calling for an alliance between the technocratic and
political elite of the Muslim world, on the one hand, and its religious scholars, on other
hand, to act in a coordinated fashion to develop a constitutional order (tartīb tanẓīmāt), an
order which would also include substantial positive legislation, that could effectively
control the autocracy of rulers and that is in accordance with the principles of the Sharī‘a
(al-uṣūl al-shar‘iyya) but at the same times incorporates the rational considerations of the
public good (mu‘tabirīn fī [al-tanẓīmāt] min al-maṣāliḥ aḥaqqahā wa min al-maḍārr allāzima akhaffahā). 49 Significantly, what he calls for is respect for the principles of the
Sharī‘a (al-uṣūl al-shar‘iyya) rather than the detailed substantive legal doctrines of the
jurists; the actual substance of the new constitutional and positive legal orders would be a
product of siyāsa, rational law-making that is based on the public good, rather than
textual interpretation of revelation. And for this reason, his rhetoric makes clear that
while he is calling for a partnership between the men of state and leading religious
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scholars, the role of the latter is largely technical, i.e., confirming that the form of the
new rules is as consistent with the principles of Islamic legality as practicable; it is the
men of state, the experts in the empirical domain of what constitutes good policy, who
are entrusted to making the substantive decisions regarding the contours of the public
good.
The common belief of Europeans that Muslims’ adherence to the Sharī‘a
precludes Muslim states from achieving progress is, therefore, mistaken, but it is a
mistake for which they must be excused in light of the reality of poor governance in
Muslim countries. For Khayr al-Dīn, the blame for the reality of poor governance lies on
the shoulders of two groups: the rulers of the day who lack sufficient fidelity to the
Sharī‘a, and the religious scholars’ neglect of their duty to keep abreast of current affairs
so they can meaningfully assist the government pursue the public good. 50
While Khayr al-Dīn’s criticism of the religious class was relatively restrained, our
next thinker, Rashīd Riḍā was not so gentle.
V. Rashīd Riḍā and the Relationship Between Political and Religious Despotism
Rashīd Riḍā, perhaps the most well-known discipline of the Egyptian religious reformer
Muḥammad ‘Abduh, spent much of his life as a proselytizer for political, social, legal and
religious reform in the Muslim world. A prolific writer and polemicist, he served as
editor for the trans-national Islamic reform journal, al-‘Urwa al-Wuthqā [“The Firmest
Bond”], authored a multi-volume commentary on the Quran from a modernist
perspective, Tafsīr al-Manār, and authored numerous fatwās (opinions on Islamic law) in
response to questions posed to him throughout the Islamic world. Indeed, one might
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consider Riḍā the first example of the modern, trans-national Muslim jurist. Given the
breadth of his writings, a comprehensive treatment of his political theories is beyond the
scope of this article. I will instead focus on his treatise with the title The Caliphate which
he published in 1922, shortly after the declaration of the Turkish Republic. At the time of
the book’s original publication, the Turkish Republic had not yet abolished the Ottoman
Caliphate, although it had relegated his position to that of a “spiritual” leader.
Writings on the caliphate have a long history in Islamic theology and law.
Anyone with familiarity with traditionalist writings on the caliphate, however, will
immediately recognize Riḍā’s work as representing a radical departure from traditionalist
discourse on Islamic government. Unlike traditional accounts of the caliphate, which
were written largely from the perspective of defending the legitimacy of the early Muslim
community’s political history against attacks from Muslim dissident groups whom the
hegemonic Sunnīs believed were heretical, and which displayed little practical concern
with how to implement those political ideals in their contemporary societies, Riḍā, on the
other hand, both read and wrote on the caliphate with an eye toward reforming the actual
political institutions of the contemporary Muslim world. This work then is an interesting
blend of ideal theory combined with his own practical analysis of the choices facing the
Muslim world in the wake of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the colonization of
much of the Muslim world by European powers.
Although Riḍā does not make express reference to either Ṭahṭāwī or Khayr al-Dīn
al-Tūnisī, he shares their concern with autocracy and despotism. His analysis, however, is
unique insofar as he identifies a vicious circle at the heart of politics in the Muslim world
in which religious and political despotism are mutually reinforcing. His solution to this
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dilemma is popular sovereignty: Muslim peoples, in his view, need to understand that all
power flows from them, and accordingly, they must demand representative government,
if need be, by force. After liberating themselves from the forces of despotism, they then
must establish a lawful caliphate, because only a lawful caliphate will be able to press
forward successfully with needed religious, social, and economic reforms.
Only a lawful caliphate, in contrast to either the spiritual caliphate proposed by
the Turkish Republic, or a revival of the caliphate of necessity (khilāfat al-ḍarūra) which
is grounded in superior military force (taghallub) e.g., the Ottoman Empire, can
successfully implement a reform program because under Islamic jurisprudence only a
lawful government enjoys a moral entitlement to obedience. De facto governments, i.e.,
governments whose legitimacy is based solely on the necessity of recognizing the
usurper’s overwhelming physical power, by contrast, enjoys no right to obedience;
instead, Muslims are only obliged to recognize such a government on the ground of
necessity (ḍarūra), and accordingly, they are entitled to ignore even worthwhile reforms
whenever they believe such reforms are contrary to their own understanding of the
Sharī‘a. Reforms undertaken by a legitimate caliph, on the other hand, will effectively
abrogate competing opinions and accordingly moral obligation will reinforce judgments
of practical politics to establish firmly in Muslim lands the desired reforms. In short,
Riḍā suggests that legitimate government is the only solution to the moral and legal
pluralism that is the product of Sunnī commitments to individualistic interpretation of the
Sharī‘a.
Riḍā’s argument proceeds along three dimensions. The first can be understood as
ideal theory, i.e., an account of what the institution of the caliphate is and why its ideals
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ought to be relevant to Muslim political thinking in the wake of World War I. Islam,
according to Riḍā, possesses both a spiritual message (hidāya rūḥiyya) and a particular
conception of civic politics (siyāsa ijtimā‘iyya madaniyya). The two are regulated very
differently, however: the former is set out expressly and in its entirety in scriptural
sources, while revelation, in respect of the latter, has done no more than “set forth its
foundational principles, delegating to the community the use of its judgment and
discretion [to provide the detailed rules].” This difference in treatment is dictated by the
difference in the substance of the spiritual and temporal: the canons of spiritual
observances are not dependent on, nor a function of particular social contexts, whereas
the rules governing political society are highly contextual. Accordingly, Islam’s
substantive rules governing political society must, necessarily, “differ with time and
place and advance in accordance with the advancement of civilization and human
knowledge.” 51
In all cases, however, properly Islamic government is characterized by certain
basic principles, which are “that authority belongs to the community (umma); that its
power is to be exercised through mutual consultation (wa amruhā shūrā baynahā); that
its government is a kind of republic (ḍarb min al-jumhūriyya); that its rules apply equally
to the rulers of the state as well as the common citizens; and, that the ruler, when
enforcing a law, is only enforcing a rule of the Sharī‘a or the view of the community
(ra’y al-umma).” 52 In other words it is a kind of representative political community
subject to its own conception of the rule of law that binds all within its jurisdiction and
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the coercive power of that political community can only be legitimately exercised either
if it is in conformity with revealed law or law that it has made democratically; however,
its power cannot be exercised to enforce the despotic personal will of the ruler. 53 The
ends of the caliphate are both civil and religious, as is evidenced by its adherence to both
civil and revealed law. It aims to preserve and enhance both religion and human
civilization and to reconcile moral virtues with material civilization and progress, and
ultimately, “prepare the ground for universal human brotherhood (mumahhida li-ta‘mīm
al-ukhuwwa al-insāniyya).” 54
Riḍā also sees the project of restoring a lawful caliphate to be something of
universal interest. Writing in the immediate aftermath of World War I’s devastation, he
was not as optimistic about European civilization as either Ṭahṭāwī or Khayr al-Dīn had
been. The barbarity of that war, and the instability it unleashed in the world, led him to
conclude that European civilization had shown itself to be morally bankrupt, which he
attributed to Europeans’ decision to exile religion from their civilization. Accordingly,
restoration of the lawful caliphate in his opinion was a universal imperative if there was
to be any hope for establishing a genuine human fraternity that cut across race and class.
Even as he is encouraging the Turks to take advantage of their liberation from Ottoman
despotism, and calls upon them to re-establish a lawful caliphate, he warns them against
basing their state on a form of Islamic particularism; he instead calls upon them to
establish a state which, for lack of a better term, could represent a kind of Islamic
humanism that would offer the hope of cross-confessional solidarity:
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“Oh Turks . . .! Undertake the [task] of renewing the government of the Islamic
khilāfa, intending thereby to reconcile religious teachings with human civilization to
serve humanity [li-khidmat al-insāniyya], not to establish an Islamic sectarian identity
(‘aṣabiyya islāmiyya) that threatens western states. If you do so, and establish your
sincerity and true intentions in [your] project, you will find among the learned, virtuous
and free westerners those who will assist you, praise your work, and defend you against
unjust politicians (al-sāsa al-muftarīn) . . .” 55
Riḍā understands that major obstacles stand in the way of re-establishing a lawful
caliphate, not the least of which was the clearly secular rhetoric that was emerging from
the leadership of the Turkish Republic. He attributes this reluctance on the part of the
Turkish republican leadership to adopt an Islamic politics to the legacy of despotism that
characterized the Ottoman Empire, especially in the last 100 years of its history. It is
understandable, then, that they would think there was a basic contradiction between
republican ideals of self-government and the caliphate, since it had been the case that
“the vast majority (jamāhīr) of Turkish, Indian, Egyptian and other Muslim clerics had
made fidelity to the Ottoman caliphs and sultans obligatory so long as they did not openly
display unbelief or commit overt apostasy, despite whatever injustice, corruption, social
disintegration and oppression of the citizenry resulted from obedience to them, in reliance
on the historically established rule of the jurists [regarding the obligation of obedience],
without any deliberation or thought.” 56
As a people who had just reclaimed their freedom from external invaders and
internal oppressors, Riḍā clearly sympathized with the Turks’ reluctance to endorse
anything that smacked of the old despotic political order. 57 Accordingly, he rejects the
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traditional rule of Sunnī Islam that prohibited revolution against unjust rulers, even if
they were usurpers, in favor of an obligation to resist usurpers and restore legality
whenever practicable. He based this argument on both Islamic grounds and, for lack of a
better term, sociological grounds. As for the Islamic grounds, Riḍā, as alluded to
previously, suggested that Islamic law recognized different notions of obedience: when
the ruler was legitimate, robust duties of obedience obtained, and citizens were bound
morally and prudentially (ẓāhiran wa bāṭinan) to obey unless the command at issue was
clearly illegal. 58 The government of a usurper, however, lacks legitimacy in itself; it is
obeyed only by virtue of necessity (al-ḍarūra). Therefore the duty of obedience to an
illegitimate government is limited to the extent of the necessity itself (al-ḍarūra tuqaddar
bi-qadarihā) and by the prudential principle that obedience represents the lesser of two
evils (irtikāb akhaff al-ḍararayn). It therefore follows that whenever there is a realistic
prospect of restoring a legal regime, the Muslim community, led by its leading men (ahl
al-ḥall wa-l-‘aqd), is obliged to resist the unjust usurper and his oppression (ẓulm) and
arbitrary rule (jawr). “An example of this is removing [systems] of personal, autocratic
rule, as the Turks did with the power of the Ottomans. Even though they claimed the
Islamic caliphate, they were unjust, relying in most cases – in the language current in our
day – on the principle of absolute monarchy, and for that reason, the Turks began by
imposing on them a basic law in imitation of the European nations.” 59
The sociological account was based on his understanding of the positive basis of
sovereignty, and that all sovereignty is at its core popular. Accordingly, he argues that
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the powers enjoyed by governments, even absolutist monarchs, are in reality never more
than the power of their people. The people may surrender this power to a despot because
they fail to understand the reality of popular sovereignty, and instead succumb to a false
political idea such as the divine right of kings, or that religion obliges obedience, or the
like, but that once a people overcomes such an ideology and discovers that it is its own
true sovereign, it quickly overthrows usurpers and restores itself to the position of master
of its own political affairs. 60
In Riḍā’s account there is a direct link between a healthy politics and a healthy
religious attitude. When Muslims lost the ability to govern themselves by accepting the
oppression and humiliation (al-ẓulm wa-l-istidhlāl) of usurpers, religious observance
became decadent too. Religious decadence manifested itself in two ways. The first was
the introduction of superfluous rituals that lacked any firm scriptural basis with the result
that discharge of those ritual observances could command the entirety or nearly the
entirety of a person’s life, leaving no time to exert one’s self in any other endeavor. 61
The second was fanatic attachment (taqlīd) by religious scholars, particularly jurists,
especially to legal doctrines without exercising any independent judgment (ijtihād)
regarding the continued vitality and relevance of such doctrines. The result was that
religious leaders, and the law they upheld, no longer had any effective role to play in
governance except to support the autocratic machinations of the unjust rulers
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themselves. 62 Having made these compromises with despotism, it was no surprise the
Muslim populations came to accept colonization by foreigners. 63
The combination of excessive ritual observance and a failure to think
independently about religion were the distinguishing features of the vast majority of the
Muslim scholarly class and their followers among the masses. Politically, this class,
whom Riḍā referred to contemptuously as “the party of the ignorant mass of rigid jurists
(ḥizb ḥashwiyyat al-fuqahā’ al-jāmidīn)” could at best produce only Islamic sentiment
among the populace; they were otherwise incapable of contributing to any substantial
reform of Muslim society. Indeed, although they whole-heartedly supported the idea of
an Islamic government, nothing worse could befall the Muslim people than a government
entrusted to this party. According to Riḍā, because of their unthinking adherence to
historical legal doctrines, they would have no objections to adopting rules of law that
were entirely contradictory to the needs of modern civilization. To make matters worse,
they would be utterly incapable of making rules for modern institutions such as the
military, finance, or politics, since the traditional methods of jurisprudence cannot be
used to derive rules for these subjects, yet they reject using independent judgment to
produce new rules. Accordingly, were it to be the case that the affairs of state were
delegated to this party, they would have been exemplary failures, whether in war or peace
(wa law fuwwiḍa ilayhim amr al-ḥukūma ‘alā an yanhaḍū bihā la-‘ajazū qaṭ‘an wa lamā istaṭā‘ū ḥarban wa lā ṣulḥan). 64
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Religious reform, therefore, had to proceed hand-in-hand with political reform.
Religious reform meant first and foremost the rejection of what he called institutional
religious authority (“sulṭa dīniyya”) in favor of simply the right of teaching and advice
(“al-naṣīḥa wa-l-irshād”) grounded in learning that is open to all. 65 Accordingly, there is
no basis to believe that the Caliph represents a kind of divinely-sanctioned ruler whose
determinations require acceptance on the pain of excommunication. 66 So too, he denied
that offices like that of a judge or muftī were religious in this sense because they lack the
capacity to formulate either dogma or rules (inna al-islām lam yaj‘al li-hā’ulā’i adnā
sulṭa ‘alā al-‘aqā’id wa taqrīr al-aḥkām). 67
This rejection of institutional religious authority means that the only kind of
authority that is recognized in Islam according to Riḍā is discursive, i.e., learning, and
accordingly, there is no basis for the doctrine of taqlīd, the obligation to defer to ancient
authorities, especially as practiced by Riḍā’s contemporaries. A lawful caliphate could
hardly be an instrument of reform if it was bound to this arbitrary conception of Islamic
law, and accordingly, Riḍā devotes substantial energy to refuting the doctrine of taqlīd
and advocating the obligation to engage in independent reasoning (ijtihād) in order to
produce a legal order that would be consistent with both Islam and modern secular
civilization. What is particularly interesting about his critique of taqlīd is not simply that
it is impractical or that it produces fanaticism, but rather that the entire system of
reasoning used in pre-modern jurisprudence to generate legal rules, i.e., uṣūl al-fiqh, was
entirely inapplicable to the problems facing Muslims in the modern age. The diminished
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relevance of traditional methods of jurisprudence is on account of their inability to
produce general rules (aḥkām ‘āmma); 68 rather, traditional jurisprudence can at best
provide individuals with answers to their particular questions and of relevance only to
that problem, but it cannot solve structural problems that require general solutions. 69
A modern caliphate, therefore, must base its system of Islamic law on a different
method of legislation, which Riḍā calls ishtirā‘. He seems to have coined this term to
differentiate his proposed method of legal reasoning from both that of traditional Muslim
jurisprudence and secular legislation. It is distinguished from the former both by its goals
and its methods. As for its goals, it seeks to determine where the public good of the
Muslim community lies, rather than to determine the true meaning of a revelatory text. 70
Its method is deliberative (shūrā) and therefore collective rather than individual because
only through deliberation does it become possible to ascertain the public interest. 71 The
community expresses its conception of its public good, in accordance with the practice of
the Prophet Muḥammad, through the deliberation of its leading men, a group which
includes religious scholars, but is certainly not limited to them. 72
In articulating a deliberative method for Islamic legislation, Riḍā relies on two
crucial ideas, one theological and the other political. The theological principle is that,
although Islam regulates all areas of human life, its regulation of the spiritual domain is
categorically distinct from its regulation of the mundane aspects of human existence.
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While it is true that Muslim jurists have referred to all such obligations generically as
shar‘, i.e., revelation, or dīn, i.e., religion, the term bears different meanings when
applied to spiritual and temporal affairs. When applied to the former, it refers to acts
whose purpose is to draw close to one’s Creator; with respect to the latter, it refers only to
the reality that God will hold one accountable for how one interacts with other human
beings in the next life, but it does not entail any conception of worship or attempt to draw
close to God. This distinction is confirmed by the fact that Islamic law divides human
acts into the domain of ritual (‘ibādāt) and transactional (mu‘āmalāt) and the fact that
jurists will declare a certain course of conduct as valid before the courts (qaḍā’an) but
nevertheless describe it is condemnable on religious grounds (diyānatan). 73 The task of
Islamic legislation in the modern age is religious only in the sense that individuals are
required to act sincerely, not that they are engaged in a ritualistic exercise involving
careful interpretation of revelation. 74
Contrary to the commonly-held interpretation of Islamic law as a religious law
that rejects the legitimacy of human law, 75 Riḍā argues that Islamic law expressly
authorizes human law through its institutions of ijtihād, independent judgment, and
shūrā, mutual deliberation. The principle of popular sovereignty is expressed through
shūrā, whose agreement is binding on the caliph. 76 Indeed, even were it not the case that
the Quran had expressly ordered Muslims to engage in law-making through the
deliberative procedure of shūrā, Islamic law’s general principles would require it: human
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law-making is a necessity for human civilization (al-ijtimā‘ al-basharī), and textuallybased rules that are not religious in nature, i.e., in the sense of drawing near to God, but
rather seek to secure temporal justice, can be revised in light of secular necessity, or even
convenience based on the Islamic legal principle of removing difficulty (raf‘ al-ḥaraj). 77
Muslims gradually lost the ability to govern themselves through when they
acquiesced to the rule of usurpers who relied on jurists to administer the law based on
conceptions of taqlīd rather than mutual deliberation on matters of the public good. 78
Restoring the Muslim body politic to health therefore requires dismantling both political
and religious despotism, represented in the former by absolutist rule, and the in the latter,
by taqlīd, and replacing both with representative institutions tasked with identifying the
public good.
Although Riḍā insists on distinguishing Islamic legislation from simple secular
legislation simpliciter, it is not a topic that he dwells on in great depth. It appears for him
that Islamic legislation is distinguished from non-Islamic, but otherwise democratic
legislation, insofar as Islamic legislation continues to affirm expressly the religious basis
of all laws (al-shar‘ al-dīnī alladhī huwa asās al-ishtirā‘ al-basharī al-ijtihādī). 79 As a
practical matter, this presumably means that clear texts of revelation must be taken into
account by an Islamic legislator, although as we have seen, if such rules regulate
temporal affairs, then they can be qualified or overridden in the name of the public
interest. Presumably, it is only religious rules in the narrow sense that are absolutely
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binding and are not subject to legislative revision since imposition of difficulty is an
essential part of what makes them religious rather than temporal obligations. 80
The decadence of the religious establishment, however, is particularly pernicious
because it undermines the ability of Islam to discharge its primary mission, namely, serve
as a source of spiritual guidance for people. Because of jurists’ irrational devotion to
ancient rules, observers believe that Islam obligates Muslims to follow ancient and
obsolete rules in social and political life, with the result that Muslims are destined to be
poor, weak and debased as long as they adhere to Islam. 81 To put it differently, not only
is the religious establishment partially responsible for the political despotism of the
Islamic world, and its inability to defend itself from western colonialism, it is also
responsible for a distorted image of Islam among non-Muslims, and the growth of
atheism among Muslims themselves. 82 Indeed, Riḍā suggests that the motive for atheism
and secularism among Muslims is not theological or philosophical as much as it is the
product of traditionalist religious teachings which, if adhered to, would make it
impossible for Muslims to live with any kind of political independence or dignity among
other nations. 83
The secularists, whom he labels with the disparaging title of “The Party of the
Would-Be Franks (Ḥizb al-mutafarnijīn),” seek to emulate European political and legal
orders more out of desperation rather than reasoned conviction. Hence, he calls them
“uncritical followers of European laws and orders (muqallidat al-qawānīn wa-l-nuẓum al80
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ūrūbiyya).” 84 And although their errors can be excused to the extent they are largely born
of frustration with the reactionary religious leaders of the Muslim world, they can
nevertheless cause great harm to the body politic if they were to take power. The threat
European secularism poses is both theological and practical. The theological threat is
clear insofar as it seeks to displace Islam from its position as moral arbiter in the Islamic
world. It also poses a practical political threat, however, for at least two reasons. First, it
will lead to the wholesale and uncritical adoption of foreign laws that will inevitably be
unsuitable for the Muslims societies that import such laws, with the result that disorder
will increase, and thus subvert the goal of reform. 85 Second, because secularists are only
a minority of Muslims, they can only achieve their goal of transforming Muslim societies
into replicas of European societies if they rely on oppression and despotic rule.
Ironically, then, Riḍā’s two political adversaries, the traditionalists and the secularists,
cannot provide political programs that can effectively deal with the backwardness of
Muslim societies while at the same time guaranteeing non-despotic rule. For that reason,
then, he argues that the Islamic reform party represents the only viable option for Muslim
peoples, because it is the only political configuration in the Muslim world that reconciles
modern civilization and Islam (ḥizb al-iṣlāḥ al-jāmi‘ bayna al-istiqlāl fī fahm fiqh al-dīn
wa ḥukm al-shar‘ wa kunh al-ḥaḍāra al-ūrūbiyya). 86
VI. The Theo-Political in the Egyptian Revolution
All three of the thinkers surveyed in this article approach the problem of Islamic law
from the perspective of the political, meaning, the idea of a just political order is prior to
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the specific rules of Islamic law. Islamic law then needs to be understood in a way that
furthers each thinker’s conception of the political. This does not mean that modernist
Islamic political thought is unprincipled or that it is merely results-oriented or crudely
pragmatic. I have tried to show how each one of these thinkers, but especially Ṭahṭāwī
and Riḍā, have thick conceptions of theology and how it relates to a just government, and
how a just government in turn plays a crucial part in the religious aim of perfecting
human potential.
Rather than advocating a separation of religion from political life, these thinkers
instead articulate a theology in which revealed law, in the political context, plays a
secondary role to practical reason in identifying the laws and policies necessary to
develop a system of freedom and justice that will guarantee the state and its citizens
dignity, independence and prosperity, and hopefully, because of the continued moral
vitality of Islam, spiritual perfection as well. Because of the priority of the political, all
of these thinkers agree that theological reasoning, after establishing the goals of the state,
should play a relatively small role in political argument thereafter and instead, rational
political deliberation should take center stage, whether that is discharged by Ṭahṭāwī’s
just ruler, Khayr al-Dīn’s councils of the learned who are to share power with the ruler, or
some kind of popular assembly representing the community on Riḍā’s theory. In addition
to their tendency to subordinate theological reasoning to practical reasoning, each of
these thinkers is at least neutral with respect to non-Islamic civilizations, in particular,
European civilizations. Even Riḍā, who is the most skeptical of the three, nevertheless
continues to think of Muslims as part of a universal human civilization and that Muslims
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need to understand their own religious commitments in a manner that is consistent with
universal human civilization.
It cannot be overemphasized, however, that their political thought does not start
with an abstract conception of the individual and how such a person then relates to his
fellows through political society. Rather, their political thought begins with the fixed
reference point of the Islamic community’s existence as a reality. Accordingly, the
reforms they advocate are justified entirely by reference to the rational good of the
Muslim community, not out of an independent principle of mutual respect that pre-exists
our religious commitments, as in the case of Rawlsian liberalism, for example.
Nevertheless, each of these three thinkers expresses genuine commitments to important
democratic values such as anti-despotism, rational law-making, the centrality of the
public good, and the equality of citizens. They do not, however, understand pluralism as
a problem that requires anything more than equal treatment under rules that are
substantively just. Thus, Khayr al-Dīn understands the alienation of non-Muslims from
the Ottoman Empire, and their desire to form ties with European powers as stemming
from the weakness and arbitrary administration of justice in the Ottoman Empire, the
implication being that if despotism is restrained, their loyalty will be assured. So too,
while Riḍā agreed that certain historical rules of Islamic law which discriminated against
non-Muslims, e.g., rules that did not admit their testimony against Muslims, were unfair
and had to be revised to make them consistent with the norm of equality, he rejected the
notion that the Islamic pedigree of the rules themselves, so long as they were
substantively fair and exempted non-Muslims from the observance of what were strictly
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religious requirements, gave non-Muslims in the Islamic world just cause to complain
and agitate for the wholesale adoption of foreign laws.
Islamic modernist political thought, however, is markedly different from other
conceptions of the theo-political in the modern Islamic world, and accordingly, when we
ask a question like “Is the Egyptian or the Tunisian Revolution an Islamic Revolution?”
we need to understand that there are different configurations of the theo-political in
contemporary Muslim societies. Islamic modernist political thought differs from other
Islamic conceptions insofar as it expressly seeks a reconciliation with modern secular
civilization. Other Islamic theo-political conceptions, such as traditionalist Islamic
political thought, whether in its Sunnī or Shī‘ī form, or in the form of revolutionary
Sunnism, e.g., Sayyid Quṭb, or revolutionary Shī‘ism, e.g., Āyatullāh Khumaynī, do not
seek such a reconciliation, but instead seek to transform the world according its own
ideals.
While Egypt and Tunisia certainly have adherents of traditionalist and
revolutionary Islamic political thought, both Egypt and Tunisia can be thought of as
normative exemplars of Islamic modernist states. Their exemplary status in this regard
can be evidenced not only in the constitutions of both states, but also by the fact that the
dominant strands of religious opposition in both countries takes the national project as a
foundational element in developing a proper understanding of Islamic commitments. The
fact that both Egypt and Tunisia have labored under authoritarian one-party states for the
better part of their post-independence histories means that, to a certain extent, modernist
Islamic political thought continues, understandably perhaps, to be dominated by antiauthoritarian commitments rather than the problem of pluralism as such, but I expect that
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will change as genuine multi-party systems come into existence in both Tunisia and
Egypt.
VII. Conclusion
Despite the fact that Islamic modernist political thought begins with radically different
premises than does modern liberalism, it nevertheless has sufficient overlap with its
concerns that it ought not to be surprising that Islamic modernists would make common
cause with both liberal and nationalist secularists. In liberalism, Islamic modernism can
make common cause with other citizens who share an anti-authoritarian commitment and
a commitment to the rule of law and in secular nationalists, Islamic modernism can also
make common cause with those who value the historical identity of the community and
desire to preserve what they perceive as its unique attributes. At the same time,
modernist Islamic political thought’s insistence on making Islam the foundation of
political commitment inevitably creates tensions with other groups in civil society:
liberals are suspicious of their commitment to individual rights; secular nationalists may
suspect them of harboring trans-national loyalties that can compete with loyalty to the
nation; and religious minorities may suspect them of harboring an intention to
marginalize them entirely from public life. From the perspective of political liberalism,
then, the most we can reasonably expect from the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions is
the establishment of a formal democratic constitution that begins with a modus vivendi
among these various contending groups, and can eventually, with some good luck, evolve
into a deeper constitutional consensus and then perhaps an overlapping consensus, but
this is clearly a multi-generational project, not something that will occur in the
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foreseeable future. We should keep that in mind when we judge whether these
revolutions should be considered successful from a democratic perspective.
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